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FILE 
~PEECJ.I 0:::' SENATOR MIK8 1-.r.ANS'FIELD 
IN THE S~NATE AUGUST 1c 54 
AFTER GENE 
AMERICAN POLICY--GERMANY AND 
1-/ r. President: Throughout !he spring and summer the problem of 
Indochina has come periodically to the attention of the Senate. It has been, per-
haps, the most important question offorcign policy to arise during the 83rd 
Congress. From time to time I have had occasion to mc..ke observations on the 
subject here on the floor of the Senate. .More often I have listened to others and 
enriched my understanding of the is sues invol ;ed. • 
The conflict in Ir..dochina has been stilled by the armistice recently 
negotiated in Geneva. This conflict is not likely to erupt again in the next few 
months. Not· is there much liklihood that diploma~ic activity now in progress 
looking to the defense of Southeast Asia will lead to fruitful results in the immedi-
ate future. 
The tide of international affairs is flowing on in the aftermath of 
Gene va, to new crests elsewhere on the globe. I would like, therefore, to address 
myself to the situation in two other areas, areas which in the next few months 
may become keys of decision in the struggle to turr. back the drive of totalitarian 
communism. These areas are Germany and Japan. 
Before doing so, however, if the Senate will bear with me for a few 
moments, there are some mattet·s of conscience which I should like to set forth. 
In the heat of debate on the Indochina issue, some of us may have slipped 
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momc:nt arily into p- rtis:>nahip. F or the most P""r t, however. these discussions 
of Indochin~ h- •e represented a se?rching for ~n honest understanding of the 
problem~ which beset us in Southe::-st ..Asi- ,nd their rel?tionehip to our polici cs 
throughout the world. They h;:-·.re been -n ... ttempt to find <-nswers , the best 
-ns,·;ers for the United St-:>tes---not ?S Republicans or Democr ts---but ""S 
Americ~ns . 
Th-t, m my opinion, is ? s it should be. While there is no constitu -
ti on-1 obli g?t ion to compel the m;> jotity .,.nd minority to coopet·;-te on foreign 
policy I thin'< that the preser 'ation of the n-:tion urgently requires us to work 
together with respect to these vital m o.ttn-s·. 
I d n - t mean •that we should agree simply for t~e sal~e of agreement , 
even when conscience compels us to disagree . I do say, however, that we should 
r efr ain from seeking par tisan advantage out of the misfortunes which the entire 
nation sustains when our foreign policy misfires , 
Some sought precisely that type of advantage , perhaps unwittingly, in 
the fall of China Lo the Communists several years ago . They may have gained, 
temporarily, frvm this course but the nati•.>n as a whole is still paying for their 
thoughtless political profit . I hope that others will not follow this example , and 
seek similar gain out of the collapse of policy in Indochina . The temptation to 
take an eye fo r an eye in this situation is great but it should be resisted . 
Both this Administraticn and its predecessor have made important 
mistakes in foreign policy. There is no perfection in the conduct of foreign 
affairs anymore than in any othe r human activity . Nor has either party a monopoly 
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on the sincere devotion to th~ welfare of the country and the wisdom which alone 
can guaranty that the policies we pursue as a nation will be the best possible 
policies . It is one of the functions of debate in the Senate to bring mistakes 
which may be made to light and, as far as possible, to pointthe way to the ir cor-
r ection . At the same time, however, it is in the interests of the nation to 
r ecognize that both administrations--one Democratic , one Republican--have done 
their best to grapple with the present threat to us all from abroad, the threat 
of international communism. 
It is against this threat which we must direct our common effort 
if we are to survive and prosper as a free nation. If we dissipate our strength 
in petty internal dissent and fruitless name - calling we shall have little left for 
deployment agains t the real enemy . 
One of the basic aims of the Soviet Union is to divide us among our-
selves. Without realizing it, many of our own people have in effect supported 
this aim . They have spoken and acted in a manner which tends to bring about an 
irreparahle cleavage between the two great political parties over issues of foreign 
policy. Such statements and actions, if continued, can only lead to the weakening 
and the ultimate ruin of the nation. 
The way to avoid this catastrophe has been shown by the bi- partisan 
manner in which the able and distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Wiley) 
haa served as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the cooperation 
he has received in this respect from the able and distinguished Senator from 
Georgia (Mr. George). It has also been i lluminated by the remarks of the 
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diotint;uishcd majority leader (Mr. l<nowland) and the distinguished minority 
leader (Mr . Johnson of Tex<s). The majority leader, several weeks ago, stated 
that 
"Neither of our great p0litical parties has a 
monopoly on patriotism ... Ltt us, he!'e and no·.v, 
Republicans and Democrats alike, rccogn~ zc 
that there ir: only ont- group th~t can pr per'y 
be charged with being 'the party of treason' 
and that is the Communist Party and the under-
gr0und conspirators . " 
The minority leader, answering for those on this side of the aish', 
replied by saying 
'''"e arc r eady to meet the President and the 
Administration half way . As responsible men, 
we arc ready at any time to cooperate in the 
pr('Servati<.n of our country. 11 
Theae two statements contain principles nf responsible leadership 
which set the nation's interest above the transitory interests of either party. 
If they prevail, the nation will be safe regardless of the perils which may beset 
us abroad . I trust that the integrity of these principles will be maintained in the 
pJlitical campttign of 1954 as they were not, unfortunately, in the pcliUcal cam-
paign of 1952. 
It would be helpful if these principles were also reflected in Con -
gressional attitudes towards the Secretary of State . Secretaries of State, 
traditionally, are not expected to be popular, except in histc rical pe rsp<>ctivc. 
Nor have they, I regret to say, as a rule, violated this tradition. 
It is time to recognize, however, that they have made significant 
contributions to the welfare and security of the nation. ll is time to stop making 
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a whipping 'ooy out of the incu:nbent of thh; office, whoever he may be, and to 
recognize that his jub is and will always be diLficult at best. It is time to 
recognize that the men who have occupied the offici.! in recent years, whether 
Rcpubli.can or Dc•nocrat, without exception. havt.. striven with deep devotion to 
thd r rht~ieJ tu safeguard this nation, within the li."l"lits of their capacity and their 
su1)port. 
There is a legitimate scope for criticism of the Secretary of State . 
There is nothing sacrosanct in that office auymorc than in any other in the govern -
ment. But if the criticism of the Secretary stems from the search for a scape -
goat, if it stems from destructive partisan purpose, then it would be better for the 
nation if it r emained unexpressed . Growing out of motivations sttch as these , 
criticism can 011ly serve to reduce the Secretary to in pot<'n<ey in the conduct of his 
office. It will tic his hands at a time when all his skills must be mobilized if he 
i s to deal effectively with the t r eachery, the force and the trickery of the 
comMunist enemy . 
'Y!ith these thoughts --these bi - partisan thoughts -- in mind, I should 
like to proceed n')W to a consider ation of certain aspects of the inte r national 
situation which are beginning to rise to the surface in the wal~c of the Geneva Con-
ference. For the first time in many years , the guns are silent on every major 
front in the world. This unusual quiet docs not signify genuine peace . Fhile it 
lasts , what we have is a period of shaky and uncertain co - e-<istcnce . 
Some may dislike the term 1 co - existence '. Some may prefer the word 
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'tru<"-.. ', or the phrase 'war withuut guns'. Whatever the preference in idiom, 
however, the fact is thal we are either engaged in war in which Americans and 
others in conaiderable numbers are being killed and maimed or we arc in a p11ase 
of non-war or cold war or so-called co-existence. 
The danuer in using the worl d co-existence to describe the present 
stale of world affairs is that the co-existence may be illusory. It may be simply 
the lull before the storm which gives a false sense of security to some and a 
sense of oppressive uneasiness to others . 
Co-existence in a world stalked by totalitiarn communism is indeed 
illusory unless it is based on t:1e utmost vigilance on our part, unless it is 
supported by a l evel of strength among the free nations that discourages aggressior 
and the threat of aggression. 
The strength to which I refer is not lo be measured solely in terms of 
atomic and conventional military hardware on hand and ready for use. This is an 
impo rtant element, but strength is also compounded of many other factors . It 
includes the moral fiber of a people, or to put it another way, their staying power; 
it includes the diplomatic capacity to win and maintain the willing and active 
cooperation of other nations and the neutrality of still o.thcrs; it includes strategic 
considerations; it includes economic health and vitality. 
Strength in an international sense is also a r elative term. It is, 
today, the total strength- - moral, diplomatic, military, strategic and economic--
of the nations linked together freely in the cause of freedom as against that of the 
communist bloc, marshalled under the command of Moscow. A relative gain in 
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a ny '"l ! these fa c to r s on o u r part means a rela tive weakening of the to tal strength 
of international communism. Any r elative gain on their part, in any category, 
sim ila rly m eans a weakening of our po sition. 
F') r s ome time now, it seems to me that the relative strength of the 
Communist Llo c has been increasing in several of the categories to which I have 
r cJ.crred. In m ilitary preparedness, we have been cutting back and reducing 
our a rmy, navy and marine corps; the Communists have been increasing theirs. 
According to a recent newspaper column, the communist camp now c0ntains 
approximately 430 infantry divisions. On our side, I understand that in addition 
to our 17 army and 3 marin e corps divisions, there are approximately 100 allied 
1 
divisions extending fro m Norway through Turkey . Perhaps another 40 or 50 
divisions are available in the Far East. The communists already possess for mid-
able air power and it is increasing; they are pushing a vast naval building 
program . Their arsenal of atomic and hydrogen weapons is expanding rapidly 
as is their research in scientific developments along these lines . 
To a great extent, this growth in Communist military power is based 
on the rapid development of industrialization, not only in Russia but in the 
satellites of the Soviet bloc. So great has been this development that the com -
munists are now beginning to mov0 into international markets in consider able 
force. Newspaper reports indicate that envoys from Moscow and Peking have 
made their appearances in capitals as far apart as Buenos Aires and Singapore , 
Oslo and Canberra, s e eking wool, chemicals, steel, rubber, machinery and 
consumer goods. Similarly, many trade m issions are visiting the communist 
capitals. 
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The gre atest pot~1 .tial !or a growth in the relative strength o! the 
communists, however, seems to me to be found in the diplomatic field. In 
pr:1c tically every major a rea of the world, they arc on the diplo m atic offem::ive. 
This is especially true in Europe and Asia. Molo tov is agai~ pres s ing fer a 
conr-ideration of a security pact in Europe, and now, after Geneva, his pro po sal 
may J'ecdve a different reception than similar proposals have obtained in the 
past. 
On the other end of the Moscow- Peking a>·is , Chou En-lai is 
attempting to charm the countries of Asia into similar so-called security arrange-
ments aimed at the United States . In view of India's progressive estrangement 
tro.n this country in recent months, the activities of the Chinese Communist 
foreiGn mmister contain implications of the most serious nature . 
There arc great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle that is now 
in progress. Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic positions 
and a reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged into their 
camp . In this diplomatic struggle , the wilti ng allegiance or the benevolent 
neutrality of entire nations is involved. 
The Communists are striving, by a combination of diplomacy and 
econor..1ic enticements , to drive the free nations furthe1· and .further apart and 
to draw as many of them as possible into their orbit or into an intermediate 
s tage of neutralism . The greater their success in this drive, the more 
inadequate our relative strength becomes, and the m o re illusory the shaky co -
exbtence that rests upon it. 
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If this drive g0c s u,1checkcd by the counter-forces of freedom, then it 
seems to me that one of two possible results may be expected. P. third world war 
will tal .. c place at some time in the not too distant future when the illusion of c o -
existence dissolves; or the world will witness the gradua.l surrender without 
stt·n £,t;l .:! of <'1os t o.l the free nations to totalitarianism. 
It is a grim prospect which confronts us and because it is so grim, I 
want to call to the attention of the Senate, the situation in two areas in which I 
believe a decisive test of the Soviet diplo matic drive will come. I refPr to the 
countries of Germany and Japan. 
These two nations possess powerful sinews of strength of the kind I 
have previously described. Vast, literate and capable populations give them an 
enormous military po tential. Advanced industrial establishments supply them 
with great econo m ic and scientific power . Situated, as they are, on the western 
and eastern fringes of the sprawling communist empire, they have incalculable 
strategic importance. 
Western G 0rmany and Japan are preuently linked to the free nations 
by tics which evo lved o ut of the military occupations following World V.'ar II. 
In the case of Germany, these are still ties of inequality; in the case of Japan, 
they are tics between sovereign equals. In both caoes , however, situations have 
developed which c o uld bring about a severance of the ties and thrust Germany and 
Japan into neutral positions or even into close relationships with the communist 
powers. 
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These developments have not come about suddenly, although they 
appear now to be approaching a climax with great rapi:lity- -especially in Germany. 
P. s long ago as 1949, however, they were beginning to become evident. I visited 
Germany in that year and reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on my 
return as fellows: 
V'est Germany, in spite of the difficulties it has faced in 
the postwar years, is en the way up .. . Although Germany 
is at the present time in a very weak position with two 
separate governments ••• it is potentially the strongest 
nation in \·'estern Europe .. . Germany is, in r.-1y opinion, 
the big prize which the U. 3 . S. R. now wants and, if necessary, 
she can ana perhaps will offe r the Germans some cf the 
lands which have been taken away from them and are now 
occupied by Czechoslova~da and Foland . This, plus the 
creation of a Russian - dominated East German army, plus 
the H.ussian championship of a united Ger:nany- on Russian 
terms - poses a difficult problem for the West . 
That was the situation five years ago. The same situation, intensified, 
exists today. It is intensified, I believe primarily because of a possible change 
in Soviet tactics with respect to Ger many. The Russians may now be en the verge 
of offering important c oncessions , economic and political, to the Germans . They 
may be prepared to do so on the basis of cne or two principal conditions: (l) that 
the Germans abandon their plans for participating in the integration of the defense 
of Western Europe; and (2) that the military forces of East Germany, Russian-
trained and equipped, be inco rporated into the defense structure of a united ~eich. 
In connection with this latter condition, the role of Forrne r Field Marshall 
Friedrich von Paulus will bear watching. He is the General who surrendered at 
Stalingrad and subsequently was director of the schools established in Russia to 
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reindoctrinatc German war prisoners. 
If the Russians intend to act along these lines , then the appeal of 
national unity may well prove irresistibl<.: to the German people; it may lead 
th--:.-:n, i 1 present drcumstances, away from the V'est. 
Under Chancellor Konrad Adtmauer, \"!estern Germany has accepted 
the cource of we:.;tcrn European integration first and national unity later , The 
Germans have accepted this course ia preference tv one of national unity . Soviet-
style, and absorption into the Communist bloc at the same time , There are s i gns . 
however, that Germany may be faltering . Recent local elections suggest a 
growing strength on the part of those political parties which favor immediate 
uniiication, parties which believe they can maintain a kind of German neutralism 
by restoring relations with Moscow and b y returning to the pre-war Locarno treaty 
system. Two pre - \..Jar German chancellors , Dr . Heirrich Bruening and Dr. Hans 
Luther, have now openly aligned themselves against Adenauer ' s policies and in 
favor of this :nislcading alternative . The recent defection of Dr, Otto John, the 
security chief of \lcst~rn Germany, may also be indicative of deep and 
disturbing political currents, Significant concessions from the Soviet Union at 
this juncture nay b~ enough to swing the Gerr.,..1ans away from the V!est. 
Thc1·e are dangerous trends in Germany today. In my view, they 
have developed because of the inter'ninable delays in restoring full sovereignty 
tv V'es tern Germany and in esta~>l ishing the European Def~nse Community. 
E. D. C . promised, at one time, to cap the m.>ve.nent towards western European 
unity which began in the early postwar years. E . D. C. offered both assurances 
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against the return of German militarism and security for German~ against the 
cxp::mding commanisl cr.1pirc-. It also p:::-omised to ;'.a:oviac an avenue fur German 
part:cipation, as an ~qu:~l in the defense of the west, oo ti:at our . hare in that de-
fcr.se mig:1t be loduccd. 
Mon.b& C\nd y~c:1·~ have elapsed since French ceniu., t-'l'oduccd E. D. C . 
But E. D. C. stHl waitf: on Fr<.r.cl: :lccer>tancc . 1'1 th~ mca:-1\.iTP" the hope for inte-
it.t:q•l'llily. The burden of its dcfcns~ continu..:s ~o fall un tl11.: occ:.!;>ation forces of 
t!lC Tjnitcd !:;tales, Britain and France . 
The Germans are not li1.~ely to acquiesce for 1nuch longer in their 
present unc,.rtain and inferior status . They have made a fantastic recovery from 
the war and now hav~ the most powerful andd) namic economy on the mainland of 
Western Europe . They are in a position to lbten to and to bargain with the East. 
After returning frorn Europe in 1951, I rcp~1rted to lhe ForeiGn Affairs 
Committee of the House of Representatives that: 
In any defense plan for Western Europe , Hnsl Germany 
must be an integral and substantial part. '''e must 
meel lhe West Ge r mans at the council table and d~cide 
what part they will ac~cpt a..; their share in me:1, money, 
and equipment in the defense of Western Europe . • . (The 
Germans) should be allowed to rearm in their own defense 
and we should recognize Vl est Germany as an <'qual. 
That was , in my view, the need tlr oc and a half years ago. It is an 
even more u r gent need now . Senate Resolution 295 which passed by a vote of 88 
to 0 just a few days ago indicates the sentiment of this body with respect to restor-
ing equality to G<.>rmany and securinG their participation in the joint deicnse of the 
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· free nations of the V' est. I believe the Administration should act quic1::.ly, in 
every pra.-:ticat-te wa·/. \:o c !vc me::1.ninp, to thin r~so~ut:on. :~ sho1llcl a.c': by the 
el"d of t1ds motith if E. D.C. is not rati.~.ied by Frar:ce. !f E. D.C. is ratified by 
th3 Frc;1ch Par} ~o.rr e~t by the end of this mor.th -- and if Italy joins b -- then 
T:16!'C is very li.~tle tlmc left. T!1c r.ext few mcn~~1s 1nay \vcll 
rev~al whether tl·e Grrmans are to ·,·ern:1in linked with the hee nn.tions or go their 
separate w;.y, 1 wRy whid1, b a~l proba1Jility, will lead sooner o~: later into the 
totalitarian camp . 
On the other side of the globe, in Japan, a second dangerous crest is 
developing in the international situation. The causes are not identical with those 
in Germany but they are just as serious. 
Unlike Germany, Japan has national unity. Full political sovereignty 
has been restored to the Japanese. They have been permitted to rearm in their 
own defense and are now in the process of doing so. 
These facto1·s in the situation, however, are dwarfed by the towering 
economic problems which confront Japan. To put these problems bluntly: if 
freedom is to survive in Japan and if there is to be peace in eastern Asia , the 
Japanese must know with reasonable assurance where the next meal is coming 
from. At the pre sent time, they do not know. 
To live as a free , peaceful neighbor in the Pacific, Japan muot 
literally fish and trade. The Japanese have been able to do neither, adequately, 
since the end of World War II. The resultant deficit in their economy 
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has been compensated !or by the United States. We provided heavy doles under 
the occupallon . More recently, we have made up the defh it largely by 
expenditures in Japan incident to the I<orcan conflict and our strategic interests 
in the wcotcrn Pacific. 
The Japanese must lurn somcwhl!re if they ar~ not to contil,ne to 
depend !or cxislen<.:e on an uncertain charity or tco1por:\l'y p.,llia.tivca li!<c 
military procurements which , in any event, arc l>t~ginni.ng to shrink . Tradl..! 
outlets in northern Asia and on the ( hinesc mainland, howeve r, arc b l od;:t·d by 
Communi .t c.;ontrol of th"'se areas as well as by the polide~ of this country and 
the United Nations. These are the tradilional avcnucn of Japanese trade . Efforts 
to develop substitutes for them elsewhere have not yet met with notable success . 
A g.Jvcrnmellt of a free uati<.. n cannot expect to rer.w.in long in power, 
if it can hold out no hope to its people other than slow starvation or unending 
dependence on alien hand-outs . The Yo::>hida gov~~1·nrnent in Japan has been on 
the whole cooperative with the United States. It is, hvwcv"r , a Japanc!;e govern-
ment.. It will either havC' to pursue policies which correspond with the needs 
of the Japanese people or it will be replaced. 
Japan is now aligned with thP free nations but the aliGnment will 
grow more uncertain and tenuous under the pressures of economic r ealities. 
Unless concerted steps are taken to meet these r~alitics , where a rc the 
Japanese to turn for survival? There is no reason to assun1e that, as a 
sovereign independent nation, they will not turn away from the present alignment. 
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There is no reason to assume that they will not veer towards Communist China, 
towards the Soviet Union or both. 
If international communism seeks to sever the ties which presently 
hold Japan on the side of freedom, it is not without resources to obtain ·this 
objective. Vast trading inducements can be offered, particularly with respect 
to the Soviet Maritime provinces, Manchuria and North China. There are fish-
ing and other concessions which could he made available in and around Sakhalin 
and the Kuriles . Rice, coal and other resources, desperately needed by Japan, 
can come from northern VietNam. 
It is entirely possible that the Communists would be inclined to act 
with a relatively lavish and open hand if they might expect in return a growing 
Japanese neutralism and ultimate incorporation of Japan into their system. 
There are measures which can be taken in concert with others which 
may forestall the loss of Japan to totalitarianism. In this connection, the Admin-
istration has recently announced that it is exploring the possibilities of closer 
relationships being developed between Japan, Korea and Formosa. Cther 
possibilities may exist for increasing Japan1 s trade with non-communist nations 
particularly in Southeast Asia and in Japanese participation in technical ass5st-
ance programs in the underdeveloped areas. 
Japan can be held in the camp of freedom, provided that this country 
and other free nations do not ignore the serious predicament in which the 
Japanese find themselves; provided we act together and in time to deal with it. 
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The weeks and months that lie ahead, wee 1ts and months in which 
the Senate will stand in recess or adjournment, will be dangerous and difficult 
ones . We <J.re entering into a period in which the President and the S~crctary of 
St~tc may be called upon to make major decisions, not only with respect to 
C".rmany and Japan but also in connection with other arl!a:J of t:1c world. 
I tbink that the President and the Secretary shoul d know that the 
Senate is cognizant of the burden t~'ey bear in conducting our foreign p Jlicy and 
t11at members of both parties will support them as far as conscience pcrmit!J , 
After the setback at Gc~cva , a sense of r enewed unity on foreign 
policy may be reasserting itself in this country, For a period, at the time of 
the truce, we were threatened by a wave of partisanship . Eut the nation may 
now be drawing closer together in the face of adversity . 
There is already a framework of agreement shared uy Dct.10Crats 
and Republicans nlike on which bipartisan policies can be maintained and 
developed. There is, for example, little party disagreement on these curren t 
courses of action: 
l. No intervention by American armed forces in Indochina. 
2. No recognition of Communis t China by the United States 
and no admittance of Communist China to the United Nations . 
3 . No Locarno pact with the communists for southeast Asia . 
4. The continued need for a European Defense Community. 
5. The granting of soverdgnty to west Germany together 
with its right to participate in the defense of Festern 
Europe . 
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Within this framework, we can pursue policies which will build 
Cl'eater strength in t~1e non-communist world - ~ r.ot aolcly milita:ry b·.1t moral , 
co - exj::;<; .~~::~ wh~.ch m<)ans -::-:.mni<:i~ ,•way in f~ar f:-om every threat o£ a fight, 
tc~alitali.::ln b:cc . We can r.ave mnre ~han the futility of a third world war 
precipitated by the hotheads among us who by some twisted 1·casoning believe 
that the way to stop u war is to act the par.t of the bully and sta1·t one . We can 
have, if we work consistently and without fanfare to build genuine strength, 
the peace we seek, a peace without fear, a peace of stability and of faith 
in the .Lltimate triumph of human freedom. 
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